With more than 1.3 Billion in cumulative number of downloads reported, the top six applications compete in the niche of Wi-Fi Direct D2D file sharing on Android. With the highest userbase in India and Indonesia, ShareIT itself reports the number of active users of their application on desktop and mobile devices exceeding 1.8 billion, ranked top 7 globally by number of downloads on Google Play and Apple App Store in 2018 [1].
I. INTRODUCTION
D2D communication in a wider view shall be the dominant mode of interaction and exchange in future wireless communication infrastructures for mobile and IoT devices. The adoption of the fifth generation of cellular mobile communication (5G) is expected to drive cellular networks from centralized to device-centric infrastructure, where both the cellular, in-band, and out-band D2D co-exist [2] [3] . D2D communications facilitate a direct connection, single hop communication, between compatible radio-frequency (RF) devices without the need for association with access points (APs) or cellular base stations (BSs). Therefore, the scope of the secure implementation is not limited only by Wi-Fi Direct. The rapid transformation of portable devices and demand for more flexible communication protocols raises the problem of their usability and security design and strengthens the need to advance existing design and evaluation practices to avoid future vulnerabilities.
D2D communications and Wi-Fi Direct:
With the introduction of Wi-Fi direct by Wi-Fi Alliance and its integration by Google into Android 4.0 [4] , its user base and use cases have increased exponentially over the past years [5] . Modern D2D communication leverages high data rate and is beneficial for mobile-to-mobile file sharing, wireless printing, screencasting, and a wide range of other domains. The adoption of Wi-Fi Direct, as an out-band (ISM) D2D protocol where interconnected devices exchange information with each other directly, without needing a global network connection, had already reached 1.7 billion in 2016 in consumer devices (tablets, smartphones, and smart TVs) and is projected to reach 21 billion by 2020. The number of consumer devices per owner is increasing and is expected to reach up to 7 devices per owner by 2020. A large portion of them will have human-in-loop model, hence their role in daily lifestyle and social contexts cannot be neglected.
The use of Wi-Fi Direct provides significant usability benefits, as compared to Peer-to-Peer (P2P) communication over the conventional Wi-Fi access point: abilities for the user to keep the primary Wi-Fi connection working simultaneously with Wi-Fi Direct data transfer and a simplified association user flow. Ensuring security for billions of such connections is crucial and so is its appropriate adoption by the users. To understand the ecosystem, human behaviour and security, we consider two scenarios i) Alice and Bob meet at a place and Alice immediately wants to share (exchange) some data (information) with Bob using digital medium and ii) Alice needs to share information from her cerebral memory, i.e., Alice can recall from her memory and converse to Bob. As a preliminary study a survey of 50 people was conducted where each pair was subjected to the stated conditions. The analysis reveals that available D2D sharing applications on the mobile application marketplaces are surprisingly popular; mostly due to the two reasons: a) high speed over Wi-Fi direct D2D RF link and b)straightforward, easy to use flow of pairing and data exchange. There is tendency to avoid instant messaging and email for file sharing due to: a) the requirement of multi-step interaction, remembering lengthy credentials, usernames or phone numbers, and b) complication of contact sharing at first meeting. An analogous information exchange in the physical world, i.e., the case where two persons can just speak and share information is very trivial and light in terms of user efforts. In order to capture the difference in effort and ease of use, we define a term effortdistance, representing extra steps, compared to the physical world which are required to complete the same task digitally. It is noted that effort-distance is high for proximity file exchange between parties. This opens usability challenges, specific to data exchange. As we note later, this creates a space for prioritising economical benefits at a cost of security and privacy of D2D file sharing mobile applications. RQ3: Can the joint notion of usability over security impact factors in such applications and underlying protocols reflect the potential security posture during the early design stage?
A. Role of UX and UI
From the user experience perspective, the manual input of passphrases leads to the risk of misconfiguration, commonly introduced by vendors and end users, such as predictable and hard-coded passwords, Section II-C. Furthermore, modern, diverse devices do not always have peripheral support for manual password input. Although usable security has been under the radar of research community [6] , the pickup of the concepts for implementation by vendors has been slow [7] [8] . There exists a spiral of frustration and blame between users and researchers [8] . Since usability plays significant role in adoption of mobile applications by people, simple and easy to use interactions are preferred [9] . However, motives to accommodate them in designing of interfaces and easing user experience may weaken the security. We shall see how usability has been misused at cost of security in top Android application for file sharing in next subsection.
The core focus of this work is to understand common tradeoffs between security and usability for D2D exchange and the reasons behind them. Typically, protocol and secure architecture designers can implicitly account for user interactions beforehand and hence reduce the risk of security trade-offs in future implementations. Many existing mechanisms limit the first-time ability of easy pairing, such as Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol which requires two entities to have a common prior knowledge, modulus and base. This motivates vendors who wish to use the scheme to provide homegrown workarounds to achieve seamless pairing of devices which are interacting for the first time.
In summary, our contributions are the following:
• We perform a practical security-usability analysis of the most downloaded D2D mobile sharing implementations, identify and report the findings to the corresponding vendors, highlighting likely causes of vulnerabilities and trade-offs in protocol design frameworks
• We quantify a combined notion of usability and security which could help the protocol designers to adapt and evaluate usability at the early stage to avoid future trade-offs in implementation Section 2 studies the security-usability trade-offs in popular D2D applications followed by inferences for designing improved protocols. Section 5 describes the proposed methodology for User experience quantification. In this section we analyze the six most downloaded Wi-Fi Direct mobile file sharing applications to provide observations of the correlation between usability requirements and the security of their implementations. Based on download statistics on Google Play, we have selected most popular file sharing applications, listed in Table I . The total number of installations of these applications on Android, building on Google Play Store statistics, exceeds 1.3 Billion (Table I) .
Wi-Fi Direct -based file sharing applications are widely used and retain a large user base due to the simplicity of the D2D connection setup and high transfer speeds. However, during our analysis we have identified a number of workarounds and security violations that vendors introduce in their products to untangle the user experience and gain access to a wider market share. As we show later in this section, the applications from our shortlist commonly introduce default or predictable connection credentials for seamless association between peers or transmit the passphrases through side channels. At the same time, our analysis shows that the shortlisted applications prioritize the performance and compatibility over security at multiple layers of their implementation.
A. Methodology for vulnerability analysis
We combine both static and dynamic vulnerability analysis techniques and automate the comparative execution analysis on multiple Android API platforms to achieve the following goals:
• Determine which network protocols are used for D2D file sharing Statically, for more detailed manual analysis we fingerprint the execution paths which contain signs of the identifiable patterns:
• References to known Java and native components and libraries (e.g. NanoHTTPD in Xender)
• Calls to sensitive or unusual Android APIs (remote storage binding, process monitoring, command execution)
• Hard-coded values of certain format (URI schema fragments, regular expression templates, long number sequences, tokens, hashes)
• Potential misconfiguration of Android-specific components (Permissions, exported Activities, exposed binding of Intents, Services triggered with poor validation)
• Cryptography-related operations, random string generation, string encoding methods
• Implementation of remote and local URI validation (schema matching, regular expressions)
• Conditions which tend to change the execution flow to fit a particular Android OS version or device vendorspecific APIs This is further extended with dynamic analysis to inspect the insecure behaviour with the following methods:
• Mapping of embedded endpoints to actual D2D sharing code snippets
• Tracing the uses of network sockets when certain functionality is requested
• Hooking Java and Android API interfaces to inspect call arguments, specifically where the code relates to cryptography operations, Wireless AP configuration, Bluetooth discovery routine.
• Generating a word-list which includes the names of sent, marked for sharing and received files, IPv4 and hardware addresses involved in communication to filter out the method calls in execution flow.
Application of these procedures in comparative execution analysis of identical scenarios on multiple physical and emulated devices allowed to identify certain discrepancies in the functions behaviour for deeper manual investigation of each case.
The corner behaviour cases normally take place when certain functionality is not supported by the device or is not permitted in the current Android API. Notable effects of the latter included fall-backs to unprotected Wireless APs from Wi-Fi Direct, switching to hard-coded credentials and setup of insecure limitations for credentials length in particular execution environments.
B. Shortlisted applications
SHAREit (com.lenovo.anyshare.gps) was launched by Lenovo in 2015 and has quickly become a world's most used D2D file sharing application. As claimed by the vendor, . It has been reported in [10] that by the end of 2017, SHAREit reached #5 Worldwide ranking position by number of installations among non-game applications. Shortly the early version was released, multiple vulnerabilities were reported, related to weak security policies and the use of connection password, hard-coded as "12345678" [11] . From the static analysis we have observed that the latest version still contains significant parts of the vulnerable legacy codebase. Notably, despite some of the functionality is no longer referenced in the UI, but still can be triggered remotely through the built-in embedded webserver routes, as shown later in this section.
The Android versions of Xender (cn.xender), SuperBeam (com.majedev.superbeam), Zapya (com.dewmobile.kuaiya.play), and MiDrop (com.xiaomi.midrop) are another commonly used deviceto-device file sharing applications that actively compete with SHAREit, with more than 300 million installs on Google Play, Fig. 2 . The newest application in our set, Google Files (com.google.android.apps.nbu.files) is also referred as "Files by Google" and "Google Files Go". Originally developed within the Google's Next Billion Users (NBU) project to target emerging markets, it is being actively endorsed on Android and comes pre-installed as a system application since Android 8 "Oreo" and Android 9 "Pie", as well as Android Go editions for lower-end devices [12] .
C. Security issues
In this subsection, we summarize our findings, which are common for the analyzed applications and discuss the usability context behind them. Notably, during the analysis of shortlisted targets we have observed that vendors tend to mirror the user flow and implementation patterns of each other. Partly, the reason for this is the nature of competition for the large existing user base, which resides on the same platform. A radical change in user interface or implementation of additional security features can create competitive disadvantage and thus is generally avoided. We note that the reflection of identical user interface and interaction flow (pairing, transfer confirmation) tends to spread security vulnerabilities which appear to be common for multiple vendors.
A key property, by which we have picked applications for our analysis was their advertised use of Wi-Fi Direct for D2D file sharing. Surprisingly, it was observed that every application in our shortlist, including Google Files 1.0.220185905 for Android implements additional fall-backs and is not using Wi-Fi Direct at all times. In particular, a common behaviour for the analyzed applications is to silently turn either the Sender or the Receiver into a conventional Wi-Fi Access Point, often disabling the authentication or sharing a hard-coded default passphrase. The user, in her turn, is not informed of such behavior in most cases and expects the files to be sent through an encrypted Wi-FI Direct link. We highlight the additional security impact, introduced by these fall-backs in our findings.
Usability of Authentication:
A number of key design decisions has been made in the reviewed applications with a clear priority on seamless device discovery and effortless association of peers. Vendors introduce custom ways of automatic peer association, which often includes the use of default credentials and those which can predicted by the client programmatically. We have also noticed that the behavior of the identical application versions regarding authentication can vary when executed on different Android OS versions. This varies from sending the password via side channels (e.g. Bluetooth, QR codes) to the use of completely unprotected AP in order to get the user out of the obligation to enter the password. A notable example of these priorities is the association of SHAREit for Android with its SHAREIT 4.0 for PC companion application to exchange files with Windows hosts. Upon start-up, the desktop application immediately raises the AP, using a hard-coded passphrase, which remains unknown to the user. The user has no control to read or change the passphrase at this point, before her AP is raised. The Android device independently predicts this passphrase in order to associate with the desktop application automatically. The exploration of the UI showed that a settings dialog which has no visible link and resides behind a click on the user picture has a field to change the AP password 1(a). However, even when the setting is found, a message encourages the user to use a default password instead, to simplify the connection of a mobile phone to the AP. No warning or explanation on the security consequences is given for having this feature enabled.
Alike SHAREit, other applications from our shortlist were identified to use similar insecure workarounds to simplify the user flow and the authentication of the Sender and the Receiver. The descriptions of these issues are listed in Table  III .
Performance over Security trade-offs Keeping in mind the wide presence of authentication trade-offs in the reviewed applications which can facilitate the attacker in gaining access to the network, we have consequently examined the implementation of data transmission in the established network between the Sender and the Receiver. As was previously mentioned, even though all applications in our list declare Wi-Fi Direct as their primary way of association, in practice this is not always the case. Due to the automatic selection of fall-backs which is normally out of user control, the data transmission happens through an unprotected Wi-Fi AP or within the existing Wi-FI connection. Thus, the functionality which is designed to rely on the encryption, provided by the network layer by Wi-Fi Direct is instead exposing the user transmitted files in clear-text though non-encrypted transport protocols (Table II) . SHAREit uses UDT [13] protocol and relies solely on the network layer security configuration, thus lacking any additional encryption or integrity protection for transferred files.
Another notable case which commonly results in user data being transmitted over existing network connection or the AP in clear-text is the auxiliary functionality of the shortlisted applications. Thus, Xiaomi MiDrop introduces a "Connect to PC" feature which is different from its primary mode of operation. Our analysis showed that in this mode the application exposes unrestricted access to the device filesystem by acting as an FTP server. The server does not isolate the file exchange folder nor uses any authentication by default. The FTP connection is served to an anonymous in-network user. Naturally, this solution has no encryption at the application layer and the port is exposed in any network that Android device is associated to, regardless of the type of this underlying link.
Except for Google Files, all the reviewed applications also support a Web Sharing mode which allows to exchange files over HTTP with other peers. It was observed that in this mode none of the applications which we have reviewed provide SSL \ TLS or any other option to protect the confidentiality of the transferred files, exposing the communication to an in-network attacker in clear-text (Table II) . Additionally, the embedded web server functionality introduces additional security vulnerabilities, delivered by its custom endpoints. We further these in the next paragraph Legacy code and vulnerable servlets: SHAREit, at its early versions, has been actively engaging a built-in web server functionality. At its current version (4.5.84), this functionality is still present in the application but is mainly used as a fallback to communicate with desktops and mobile devices running platforms different from the host. Our static analysis of the SHAREit 4.5.84 for Android showed that a major amount of legacy functionality is not used in the user interface anymore yet is still served by the web server, exposing a number of endpoints, that can be remotely triggered from any network that the device is associated to. The implementation of this code, including the code-base, currently used to support the Web share feature, has poor access control mechanisms and often lacks input sanitation, allowing the attacker to exfiltrate files from the device and perform Cross-Site-Scripting (XSS) against the Receiver. Thus, it was observed that multiple endpoints of Superbeam Web share mode does not sanitize the input data, allowing for injecting reflected and stored XSS, performed by the Sender. For the latter, a stored payload is rendered into the UI from the filenames, which the Sender advertises and is rendered from them on the Receiver's side.
Another scenario of a Sender-to-Receiver attack was observed in the Google Files application on Android. Due to the lack of parameter filtering and sanitation on both sides, it was possible for the Sender to transmit her crafted username over the network, which allowed to manipulate the contents of association confirmation dialog at the Receiver side, by rendering additional layout elements and commenting out Fig. 4 .
Similar to SHAREit, Xender application also provides a Web share feature for compatibility with desktops and third-party mobile devices. However, as opposed to SHAREit which only activates its web-server on port 2999 during file sharing, Xender immediately starts it in the background with the application runtime on TCP port 6789 of Android device, even when no file sharing is in process. Our study of the reconstructed application code and dynamic analysis identified an exposed endpoint, which allows to access arbitrary files from the device through file path manipulation. Regardless of the user's intention to send or receive files, the vulnerable service is raised automatically and is exposed to anyone in the same network. This provides a stealth channel to obtain arbitrary files from the file-system without user notification, acting as a remote backdoor on the victim Android device.
Password transmission through side-channels: While
MiDrop and Google Files rely on Bluetooth for proximity search of their peers, other applications use it as a side channel to transmit the association credentials between the Sender and Receiver. SHAREit requires a granted access to Bluetooth "to increase user connection speed" (Fig. 5(a) ). However, we have observed that if the Bluetooth connection is successfully established, SHAREit uses it to transmit the Access Point credentials in its fall-back mode and seamlessly associates with the peer device. Otherwise, if the credentials cannot be transmitted with Bluetooth, the Sender will be asked to authenticate with a passphrase. Notably, the fact of establishing a Bluetooth connection is not reported to the user and requires no pairing or other confirmation. On the contrary, Zapya makes the user aware about the transmission of AP credentials over Bluetooth and provides an implicit switch to disable this feature ( Fig. 5(b) ). Xender and Superbeam, in turn, engage QR codes as a primary way to exchange the credentials, needed for sender and receiver to associate. The example of such QR code is shown at (Fig. 5(c) ) and encapsulates the credentials in the URI, the AP name and its passphrase are observed at nm and pw parameters:
http://www.xender.com?nm=AndroidShare_4615 &pw=049a0ae278e5&i=43&p=19638464
Insecure OS version-specific workarounds on Android 7.1 to 8: The continuous deprecation of APIs in the Android security lifecycle [14] often introduces additional permission restrictions for its non-system applications. With a natural intention to obtain more control on the application behavior and to improve general security and privacy posture of the platform, these can cause an unexpected effect for the users, causing the developers to urgently deploy workarounds. Thus, with the upgrade Android OS to 7.1, non-system applications lost the ability to programmatically raise a DHCP-enabled Wi-Fi Hotspot [15] [16] . If the application is executed on newer Android APIs, Android 8 and 9, it can use an interface Wifi-Manager.LocalOnlyHotspotReservation which was introduced to particularly solve this problem [17] .
Although on some devices and platform versions particular applications from our shortlist are shipped pre-installed with system privileges (Google Files, Xiaomi MiDrop), they do not always have this advantage. We have identified a common insecure workaround, specific to Android 7.1, implemented by most applications from our list. The efforts of developers to keep their applications functioning on this platform has resulted in solutions that override existing in-app security mechanisms which would be present if the application was executed with particular Android APIs.
Thus, to keep the file transfer functioning when running on Android 7.1, ShareIT 4.5.84 , Xender 4.2.2.Prime and Zapya 5.7 (US) set the Android settings dialog with open AP (security: none) and ask for the users action to enable it ( Fig. 3(a), 1(b) ). Moreover, in a case when the user preconfigures a hotspot with own WPA2 passphrase in Android settings, the above-mentioned applications would override these settings and permanently reset the security mode back to None (Fig. 3(b) ). Remarkably, Zapya even adds an explicit warning for the user to prevent her from making changes in the AP configuration: "Notice: You only need to enable hotspot. There is no need to change other hotspot settings, otherwise, making other changes may lead to connection error" (Fig. 3(c) ). Indeed, ignoring this warning and manually protecting the hotspot with a password in the settings dialog resulted in complete malfunction of ShareIT 4.5.84 and Zapya 5.7. If the Access Point has WPA2 enabled, the peer is unable to authenticate and connect. Similarly, in Xender 4.2.2. Prime the connection dialog doesn't allow to associate with its peer if its password is longer than 8 symbols. This limitation puts significant security limitations even when the user is concerned to encrypt her hotspot. Xiaomi Mi Drop applies an identical workaround for Android 7.1. However, instead of raising an unprotected host-spot, it sets a predefined password, which is programmatically predictable by the client. Changing this default password results in association failure, analogous to behaviour of SHAREit and Zapya.
Reported vulnerabilities: Table III lists descriptions of vulnerabilities and assigned CVE IDs which we have reported to the corresponding product vendors, based on our findings, summarized above in this section.
Open usability problem of Wi-Fi Direct: WPS: Essentially, Wi-Fi Direct protocol does not have a dedicated way to agree on a shared secret. The Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS; originally, Wi-Fi Simple Config) was introduced to facilitate the secure association using either PIN or push button confirmation. The usability goal was to enhance the flow for users who are not comfortable with configuration dialogs and embedded devices which might not have peripherals to provide a setup interface. The WPS architecture also supports a Registrar -either a separate device or integrated to the AP service which helps client devices in enrolling to the network. The short PIN is commonly used to agree on secret keys [18] . While push button is vulnerable to a nearby attackers, short numeric PIN can be exposed and guessed in multiple ways [19] [20] . If the association flow allow the user to set their own PIN, this adds a human factor to the system, causing a risk of using predictable numeric combinations. This opens a research problem to build both usable and secure solution for shared secret agreement in Wi-Fi Direct.
III. OBSERVATIONS ON THE PROBLEM STATE
Considering the state of problem pertaining to implementation of usable and secure D2D file exchange, we further interpret the lessons learned from Android application analysis to seek answers to the research questions mentioned in Section I. When the systems are implemented in reality, a clear tradeoff between security and usability comes in to play as attempts are made to fit the end user expectations. It becomes clear Fig. 6 . Needful modifications with KTT that the economics, hidden in high user base, is the key factor governing the UI and UX priorities.
The study on product implementations show the initial authentication and secret establishment is not inherent part of the Wi-Fi Direct protocol. It is solely decided by the developers who try to re-invent the software flow various ways. Hence critical questions like:
I1: How to generate and share PINs?
I2: How to confirm authentication? needs attentions and checked for workarounds. Another basic assumption is that if PINs are shared with trusted mechanisms, the communication channel will be secure through WPS provisioning. An important factor which causes the user to appreciate for the easiest way of association with another peer, for file sharing, is the ground that D2D connections commonly happen "on-the-fly" by portable devices. The application designers in this case are challenged in finding a dedicated source of randomness (entropy) for mutual authentication. Thus, it is not easy to perform secure shared secret key agreement, i.e. approach to generate and transmit passphrase without asking the user to type them in.
Addressing RQ1 and RQ2: The analysis of popular D2D file sharing applications on Android, in Section II-C, reveals that in a race for growing the user base a number of tradeoffs are introduced in favour of seamless peer association but at the cost of security. Notably, mirroring the similar functionality from vendor to vendor often results in exact replication of user interface to facilitate the user habits. We demonstrate that with the identical patterns of user flow being reconstructed, the similar bugs are also propagated to new implementations by independent vendors. In addition, any radical change in user interface can create competitive disadvantage and thus is generally avoided by vendors. This motivates to work towards a methodology to face usability considerations at the early stages of the communication protocol design.
IV. CONSIDERATION OF USER EXPERIENCE
In this section we motivate the need for a joint notion of usability and security. Further, we discuss how an unified mapping of experience and interaction among systems and users can be helpful for Wi-Fi Direct based application designers.
Addressing RQ3: In order to address RQ3, we break the design of an end-to-end mobile application in to 3-phases connected with feedback loops, Fig.(6) . The investigation identifies two weak feedback links: a) feedback from the developers and b) feedback from UX experts to protocol designers. UX experts, as in the current state, review applications and products using different surveys and User Journey Maps (UJM), [21] , but only after deployments of software and user-interfaces (UI). The feedback to UI and application development team are well understood and taken care of in successive iterations of an application. But there exists little or no provision to convey issues to the protocol development team; due to different terminologies or parameters and weak communication channel. Similarly, 'Best practice' is often followed while designing security paradigms where human capabilities and psychological relations are not taken in loop which subsequently leads to security being perceived as burdensome and onerous, users are asked to perform tasks beyond their capabilities, [22] and [8] . The paper rather proposes to empower security and protocol designers with an abstract understanding of takeaways by research communities, including finding from psychology, human-computer interaction, and design science.
We argue that Knowledge Transformation and Transfer (KTT) would be a better strategy for usable security. As shown in Fig. (6) , security protocol design can be thought of as two blocks: a) fundamental mathematics and b) protocol and interactions. While designing steps of protocol and interaction points, experts can gain from collaborative attempts of researchers from heterogeneous domains including security, psychology, human-computer-interaction and design science and accommodate pre-defined suggestions. The system thus developed will have inherent usability and would require less time as well.
Typically, a usability study is performed after the completion of the core protocol design and when at least the UI mockup is produced. As discussed in section III and represented in Fig. 6 , the knowledge from previous studies and diverse domains needs to be transferred and contextualized to protocol design space in order to avoid workarounds by developers and UI/UX designers. We aim to do so through extension of UJM for interactive unification of protocol and user spaces. This can form base for security architects to quantify the usability right from the start of protocol design. The traditional tools, such as System Usability Scale (SUS), [23] normally do not take into account steps of the actual protocol development chain and can only be adopted after the core logic and UI prototype are designed.
A. Unification of System and User Space
We note that UJM is a standard method for experience mapping of users and is popular in design science community, [24] . But the inferences are very limited and done at the product view. In practice, it can be cumbersome to test the multi-user system with a set of interfaces right at the beginning of protocol conceptualization. For the communication protocol design, UJM is not fully suitable. In addition to these limitations, currently there is no closed-loop-feedback based representation methodology which allows security and usability to intersect for a joint evaluation. Such as in the case of D2D file sharing, security researchers do not have well-defined metrics to quantify the future usability of the protocol and estimate the user interactions. UX engineers, in their turn, have no tool to affect the protocol space and are In practice, a typical security system, product or service can be considered in two conceptual spaces: a) protocol space and b) user space. We modified UJM in attempt to bring these two spaces under one tool, establishing a joint notion of security and usability quantification. We encourage protocol designers to consider the metrics as mentioned below: 1) Define expected user steps at each block. 2) Note down the points where user inputs or interactions, U in , are expected in any form, categorize user interaction and assign a corresponding value, α i , from the lookup table, T in (U in ), Fig (7(a) ). 3) Estimate the time taken, t i+1 − t i , at every step of the system or protocol. 4) Calculate the usability as reciprocal of user engagement,
. This approach expects the determination of blocks, user interactions and time in computations in a way to benefit the usability. Based on our study from the feedback across 43 participating users, we provide a lookup table, Fig.(7(a) ) which provides an example of interaction weights for typical actions that they encountered in Android applications. As shown in the lookup table, Fig.(7(a) ), the weights are assigned to each possible degree of interaction, α i . The clicks and taps, being the easiest of tasks, are also lowest on interaction scores. The action which require recalling from memory set additional cognitive effort for users, hence accounts to score of 0.8. Waiting for the UI to respond relates to the time. The longer the time is spent for the system to respond or for the process to complete, the larger is the resulting multiplicative value α i .
The described approach can be further extended to unify the consideration of security principles and design science in a way that it can be used as a tool while designing protocols and ascertain that usability does not fall below a threshold when the product is released. We believe that a similar approach can facilitate the comparison of multiple drafts of the proposed protocol and tracking the resulting user flow.
V. RELATED WORK AND DISCUSSION
The high user base of the applications reviewed in this paper results in an increased impact of vulnerabilities which appear in the ongoing releases. These issues could be faced in advance by adopting highly usable methods of authentication and pairing, given that they can be adopted without any modifications to commercial devices. Multiple research have tried to address the key issues related to I1 and I2 and have encountered challenges in ensuring adoption in Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) devices and integration with Wi-Fi direct. [25] suggests that Wi-Fi Direct is less favourable than Hotspot for application development in terms of usability, security and performance. [26] does an vulnerability disclosures of printers and smart TVs from HP and Samsung and highlights issues with WPS Provisioning. [27] highlights that Group Owner (GO) devices in Wi-Fi Direct can be subjected to the EvilDirect attack where an adversary can emulate as GO and compromise the the wireless link between the clients and the legitimate GO.
Previous methods of secret pairing like [28] , [29] , [30] and [31] , for spontaneously communicating devices, would not work for non-contact devices as they require physical contact for secret establishment. [32] requires touch interaction which is not always a general case during D2D exchanges. [33] requires ad-hoc setup and multiple antenna. [34] uses gesture tagged codes but are limited by very low entropy and still has dependencies on human cognition. [35] , [36] and [37] give details of security paradigms in D2D communication network which encompasses both inband and out-band D2D pairing methods and cellular network facilitated exchanges under the framework of 3GPP LTE. A large portion of the works require AdHoc modes and support from network. Thus, [18] identifies multiple attacks in Wi-Fi Direct-based D2D communications and introduces a short authentication-string-based key agreement protocol. To effectively face the usability and security challenges, a system is expected to have a minimal expectation for the user input. For the file transfer in mobile environment, it is crucial to support the seamless establishment of a communication link for devices which have never been paired previously. As shown in this work, limitation of these properties in the system design reflects in the introduction of side channel credential transmission and weak design patterns by application developers.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper provides a joint security and usability study of the top six most downloaded D2D file sharing applications on Android and identifies the common factors behind the vulnerabilities and insecure design decisions. We endorse an open problem of usable security design which lies behind the identified vulnerabilities and propose a concept of an extended User Journey Map (UJM) as a step towards better notion for application and protocol design. The further development of joint consideration of impact factors could reduce the space for appearance of identical vulnerabilities in applications and their underlying systems at the early design stage.
Finally, with our analysis on the practical domain, we hope to motivate more future work in the usability direction of secure protocol design.
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